representation, according to a contemporary art historian, has, in turn, inspired a great many "iconographical studies" by mid-and late-Qing scholars eager to establish correspondence between the venerated classics of their literary sources and visual artifacts.22 As may be seen readily, this little tale of which thinker learned from whom, whether strictly historical or not, can attain enormous significance for one assessing the development of ancient Chinese thought. In a culture where priority and antecedent-and not just origin-inevitably posit also authority, whether Confucius took some ideas from Laozi matters a great deal.
One aspect of how it matters, in fact, surfaces in the last and third assertion of Sima Qian, for his biography tellingly observes that "today, followers of Laozi denigrate Confucianism and students of Confucianism also denigrate Laozi." Taken as a description of the relations between these two schools of thought descending from ancient China and already heir to protracted and intense rivalry by the Han, the historian's words are nothing if not historical and factual. Indeed, they would acquire added truth and acuity across the centuries in highlighting such a clash of sentiments that has persisted down to the present. 
Rhetoric
If the dating of the DDJ and the identity of its putative author or compiler(s) still await solution despite recent discoveries of new textual materials, the construal of textual meaning also continues to pose daunting challenges, as is evident in the scholarly discussions recorded in the Dartmouth Conference proceedings volume. In spite of its being one of the shortest classics of antiquity, its terse and subtle rhetoric, devoid of any mimesis of conversational discourse among named (and frequently known) figures of history-a staple feature in the vast majority of Warring States texts harking back to the Analects-has teased and tantalized readers down through the centuries. This and other features may contribute to explaining why the DDJ has been one of the most translated ancient texts of China in our time.
When compared with another text like the Zhuangzi, the DDJ displays a much more limited vocabulary and simpler diction, and its overall syntax seems less complicated than even a text like the Mencius. Upon every scrutiny, however, the DDJ appears to sport a deliberate predilection to exploit a well-known feature of classical Chinese: the grammatical fluidity, and thus ambiguity, of individual words. As all students of the language realize, a single graph in literary Sinitic, depending on the context, may be used as either a noun, a verb, an adjective, or even an adverb. How the reader construes its grammatical function will significantly modify its meaning. But, apart from this general linguistic character, why the DDJ continues to vex and perplex its every interpreter and translator must be the parlous and pervasive lack of infratextual context to ground one's conjecture of grammatical functions and meanings. Bereft of any dialogical or narrative constraints manifest in so many of the texts that purport to record the gathered teachings of Warring States thinkers, the voice of the DDJ speaker at once asserts and teaches anyone and no one, a discourse without context or audience. The pithy, verse-like meditations are unlike other known specimens of Chinese poetry of antiquity. Despite the noticeable use of rhyme and the tetrasyllabic line in many segments of the work, the textual content hardly engages any concrete specificities or visibilia of the natural (for example, the fauna and flora of the Classic of Poetry that so pleased Confucius) and human world. Among the early group of Warring States texts, the gnomic and sapiential texture of the DDJ is manifestly laced with the most abstract of diction. The occasional transposition of different sections in any one YU Reading the Daodejing text-a problem that may have been caused by copyist "error," redactor judgment, or the "misplacement" of writing materials like bamboo slips-and the seemingly casual insertion of connectives like "hence" or "therefore" augment the difficulty in gauging argumentative logic or coherence. To illustrate yet again some of these difficulties, the familiar sentences that open Chapter 1 of Part I of the received text (the chapter order of which will be presupposed throughout this brief essay)24 may serve as the convenient example beginning our discussion. Most interpreters of the first dao seem to favor collapsing the two nominal usages into a related one: thus an abstract principle becomes metaphorically a way to be walked on or a path to be followed, a trope that finds increasing preference among recent English translations. For the second dao, the last option of the verbal meaning as saying or speaking has also been the preferred reading of most translations, in Western languages or the modern Chinese vernacular, especially in the light of such later comments by Zhuangzi: "The Way has never had borders, saying has never had norms... The greatest Way cannot be cited,/The greatest disputation cannot be spoken,. "constant Name" is no more nameable, as we shall see, than ascribing to the constant Way a disposition for prescriptive guidance. After such an intriguing beginning, the DDJ text goes on to declare: That-which-is-not names the beginning of heaven and earth. That-which-is names the mother of ten thousand things.
The subject of these two sentences that I deliberately render in this clumsy manner refers, of course, to two of the most important dialectical concepts in the text: the wu XX, and the you 4 that have the literal meanings of "there is not" and "there is," although those meanings obtain in this particular instant only if the two graphs are taken to be nominals. If they are regarded as adjectives (and thus it obliges the concomitant switch of name [ming] from a verb to a noun), both the grammar and the semantics of the two statements may change significantly to the following: Without name (i.e., the nameless), the beginning of heaven and earth. With name (i.e., the named), the mother of ten thousand things. There is nothing in the received text's Chinese construction, as far as I can determine, that would prevent either reading, but the force of the two assertions and their nuanced implications vary with the grammatical changes, much as the Keatsian "a thing of beauty is a joy forever" is not to be equated with the tepid "a beautiful thing."
To both these sentences in the Mawangdui manuscripts, as A. C. Graham rightly observes,28 there is added a terminal particle (ye -1t), in which case, the construction decisively prohibits making wu and you the nominal subjects. Instead, that feature turns the nameless (wu ming ,fPi ) and the named (you ming >:r) into the proper ones. However, it must be pointed out as well that this particle is tagged on to all first six sentences of Chapter 1 of the Mawangdui versions. The particle is a staple feature of definitions, explanations, and conclusions, and thus the way those texts punctuate, for this reader at least, conveys the tone and flavor of a particular editorial explanation.
Despite a date earlier than the received text's extant version, the Mawangdui texts may be no more authoritative than the later received text in providing us with the most "authentic" or compelling textual meaning. In this regard, it is unfortunate that the early chapters of the DDJ are not preserved in all three of the Guodian versions.
Wu and you in the DDJ and other classical Chinese texts have, of course, been translated frequently as "nothing" or "non-being" and "something" or "being. First, the reading does not provide us with even a hint as to why the text should want to bring up the issue of desire and its lack thereof so abruptly at this point as a requisite for its cosmic observer. True enough, by Chapter 3, the speaker is already using the phrase "wu yu ,~ 'C," but this is perfectly understandable even in a confined segmental context in which the discourse concentrates on how the sage's action would affect the people. In Chapter 1, on the other hand, we have no such indication. Why do we need desire to observe the wonders or subtleties (miao) of something, and why do we need to be rid of desire to observe the very limit of something ( In sharp contrast to the Confucian teaching on names, the Dao in such a view exists linguistically as an uncertain signifier. In the thought of the DDJ, the Dao is referentially elusive, for it points neither to any palpably physical or material object (despite its being designated as a "thing" that, according to Chap. 21, is "shadowy and indistinct" ['1'2 both in itself and in its image) nor to a fixed mental concept. Because of its invisibility, inaudibility, and intangibility, the speaker heaps on it such descriptions as "evanescent s," "rarefied t," and "minute M." Although "these three cannot be fathomed, they commingle to become one," existing in such oxymorons as "the shapeless shape, the substanceless image ,tA,J ;a ' , ~tI" (Chap. 14). Haphazard as this process may seem in constructing a "foundational" concept for his thought, the DDJ speaker is not at all shy in detailing all sorts of features and activities of the Dao. Because "the ten thousand things of the world are born from that-which-is, but that-which-is is born from that-which-is-not" (Chap. 40), wu and you thus both constitute the "nature" of the Dao. Appositely, therefore, it is the "Dao [in the creative process] that begets one, one begets two, two betgets three, and three begets ten thousand things" (Chap. 42). In attributing (Chap. 51) a cosmic procreative and nurturing role for the Dao and Virtue (de), the DDJ echoes the punning definition in the Zhuangzi: "that by which things obtain (de) life is called Virtue ( society tends to exalt "something," "doing something," "knowledge," "male," "big," "strong," "hard," "straight," and the like, the DDJ takes pains to foreground the opposites of "nothing," "doing nothing," "ignorance," "female," "small," "weak," "soft," and "crooked." The latter group of characteristics, however, represents more than mere oppositions, for they are ineluctably related to the former. One unavoidably implies the other because Laozi's assumption is that such is the nature of the universe.
Verbal ironies of this sort in both Laozi

Hence the text observes:
What is about to shrink Will always stretch out; What is about to weaken Will always be strong; What is about to become useless Will always flourish; What is to be taken Will always give out. This is called minute discernment The meaning of reversion (fan), however, is not exhausted by opposition or opposite. As the idea is discussed in the DDJ, it acquires further development when it becomes associated with such notions as reversal and return (gui, fu). When attempting to describe the invisible, inaudible, and ungraspable Dao in Chap. 14, the text goes on to say: "Its upper part does not dazzle;/its lower part is not opaque./Unending, it cannot be named;/Once more it returns to no thing MMS,i t." The movement of the Dao thus operates in the mode of recursive cyclicity, because according to the logic here, that you which is begotten of wu (Chap. 40) will also eventually go back to "nothing." Hence the crucial and grand declaration of Chap. 16:
The ten thousand things flourish together; And I use them to observe reversal i j21, . The irony of the declaration here is generated precisely by the paradox that when everything seems to be alive and thriving, the sage speaker-and he alone-is the one who sees through that very phnomenon to adduce an opposite condition. Thus he continues:
Now, these things thrive in abundance, But each again returns to its roots. Return to roots is called stillness. Isn't it because he has no desire to appear as a worthy (Chap. 77)? Laozi might not have been a revolutionary, but measured by even the values of more than two thousand plus years after him, his thought is nothing if not extraordinary. At a time when officials of particular nations on earth are vying to vaunt the ability of their leadership or the merit of incomparable power even in the looming shadow of catastrophic conflict, the wisdom of the DDJ seems ever more compelling and urgent.
